

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13  
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02  
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R 191744Z JUL 78  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3129  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS BEL  
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0449

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR  
SUBJ: MBFR: UK DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET, POLISH, AND GDR REPS

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF REPORT MADE AVAILABLE  
TO US BY UK DEL OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN UK REP AND  
SOVIET REP TARASOV, POLISH REP STRULAK, AND GDR REP  
OESER WHICH TOOK PLACE JULY 14. PATRICK MOBERLY OF  
FCO AND UK DEP REP GILLMORE, WHO DRAFTED THE RECORD AND  
MADE IT AVAILABLE TO US ON JULY 18, WERE ALSO PRESENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. MR. MOBERLY OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY ASKING EASTERN REPRESENT-  
ATIVES TO STATE WHAT THEY CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT  
ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF 8 JUNE. MR. STRULAK REPLIED  
THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF MANPOWER PARITY  
AT CEILINGS OF 900,000 AND 700,000 MEN WAS PROBABLY THE MOST  
IMPORTANT POINT. BUT HE WENT ON TO LIST OTHERS, SUCH AS THE  
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ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY AND UNEQUAL MANPOWER  
REDUCTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION IN THE FIRST  
PHASE.

2. MR. MOBERLY SAID HE THOUGHT THE EASTERN POSITION ON ARMAMENTS  
REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE WAS NOT CLEAR AND THAT HE WOULD BE  
GRATEFUL IF EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES COULD EXPLAIN THIS IN GREATER

DETAIL. THE EASTERN HEADS OF DELEGATION DID NOT ANSWER A QUESTION ABOUT TYPES AND NUMBERS OF ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED BY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA; THEY CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE OPEN-MINDED ON THIS ISSUE WHICH WOULD BE FOR NEGOTIATION IN THE SECOND PHASE. IN ANSWER TO FURTHER QUESTIONS MR STRULAK SAID THAT THE WEST COULD DEDUCE FROM THE FACT THAT THE EAST WAS REQUIRING ONLY SELECTIVE AND DIFFERENT ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I THAT THE EASTERN POSITION IN THE SECOND PHASE WAS LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR.

3. MR. MOBERLY ASKED EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO OUTLINE THEIR POSITION ON UNIT REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. ON THIS EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOWED THEMSELVES LESS RELAXED. MR. TARASOV STATED THAT SINCE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE REDUCING BY UNITS IN THE FIRST PHASE IT WAS ONLY LOGICAL TO EXPECT THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA TO REDUCE BY UNITS IN THE SECOND. FURTHERMORE REDUCTION BY UNITS WAS IMPORTANT, SINCE "PUBLIC OPINION" WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT WHICH ALLOWED MANPOWER REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD SPOKEN ONLY OF REDUCTIONS AND NOT OF LIMITATIONS, MR. TARASOV SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SEE THE POINT OF REQUIRING A WITHDRAWAL BY UNITS IF THERE WAS NO SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION ON SUCH UNITS AT RESIDUAL LEVELS. BOTH HE AND MR. OESER EXPRESSED SOME INCREDULITY THAT THE WEST WOULD MAINTAIN ITS POSITION THAT FOLLOWING PHASE I WITHDRAWALS THERE  
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SHOULD BE NO LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET DIVISIONS.

4. MR. MOBERLY SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BE THE FIRST TO DRAW ATTENTION IN THE DISCUSSION TO THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF DATA AND TO THE NEED, RECOGNISED NOW BY BOTH SIDES, FOR AN AGREED DATA BASE. MR. TARASOV SAID THAT GIVEN THE EXISTING DISAGREEMENT ON DATA, HE DID NOT SEE WHY THE WEST COULD NOT ACCEPT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE. ELABORATING ON THIS, HE SAID THAT AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED TO FREEZE THE MANPOWER OF THE TWO SIDES AT THE AGREED COMMON LEVEL CEILINGS OF 900,000 AND 700,000 AT A FUTURE DATE (HE GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE 1 JANUARY 1979). UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT THE TWO SIDES COULD THEN SATISFY THEMSELVES BY ADEQUATE VERIFICATION THAT THE CEILINGS WERE BEING RESPECTED. HE DID NOT SUGGEST WHAT MEANS OF VERIFICATION MIGHT BE EMPLOYED.

5. IN DISCUSSION AFTER LUNCH, MR. TARASOV SAID CRYPTICALLY THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT PRESSURES IN THE UNITED STATES MIGHT CAUSE THE WEST TO GO BACK ON POINTS WHEN SOME PROGRESS HAD ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED. PRESSED, HE SAID THAT HE HAD INFORMATION THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN ATTEMPT TO WITHDRAW THAT PART OF THE WEST'S 16 DECEMBER 1975 OFFER WHICH COVERED THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS. HE SAID THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT

SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE LINKED WITH THE DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE OF ERWS. IF A DECISION TO DEPLOY ERW WERE REACHED, A CASE MIGHT BE MADE OUT IN THE WEST FOR DROPPING THE OFFER TO LIMIT ALL NUCLEAR WARHEADS AT RESIDUAL LEVELS SINCE IN THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE CLAIMED THAT A GREATER NUMBER OF WARHEADS WOULD BE NECESSARY. MR. MOBERLY AND MR. BOLLAND REPLIED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST THEY HAD HEARD OF ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDUCE AND LIMIT US NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN PHASE I MIGHT BE RESCINDED.

6. WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD BE TAKING LEAVE IN THE SUMMER, MR. TARASOV SAID HE WOULD MIX LEAVE AND WORK IN MOSCOW. THE EAST NEEDED TO PREPARE FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A WESTERN RESPONSE IN THE AUTUMN TO THE LATEST EASTERN PROPOSALS. END TEXT  
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7. UK REP SUMMARIZED THIS CONVERSATION TO US DEP REP AND FRG REP IN TRILATERAL SESSION JULY 14. HE ADDED TO ACCOUNT ABOVE THAT WHEN HE HAD ASKED TARASOV A FURTHER QUESTION AS TO THE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION ON ALLEGED US PLANS FOR ER WARHEADS, TARASOV HAD REPLIED THAT HIS SOURCES WERE FROM OUTSIDE OF VIENNA. COMMENT: US DEP REP LATER TOOK UP THIS ISSUE WITH TARASOV, SEE SEPTTEL.DEAN

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